Researcher Database

KENGO MIYAZONO
Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences Division of Humanities Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies
Associate Professor

Researcher Profile and Settings

Affiliation

  • Graduate School of Humanities and Human Sciences Division of Humanities Department of Philosophy and Religious Studies

Job Title

  • Associate Professor

Degree

  • Master of Letters(The University of Tokyo)
  • Doctor of Letters(The University of Tokyo)

Research funding number

  • 20780266

J-Global ID

Profile

  • My main research areas are philosophy of mind, philosophy of psychology, and philosophy of psychiatry.

    See my personal webpage for updated information. 


     

Research Interests

  • Philosophy of Mind, Philosophy of Psychology, Philosophy of Psychiatry, Philosophy of Science, Early Modern Philosophy   

Research Areas

  • Humanities & social sciences / Philosophy and ethics

Academic & Professional Experience

  • 2015/04 - 2016/03 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research Fellow (PD, Keio University)
  • 2013/01 - 2014/12 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Postdoctoral Fellow for Research Abroad (University of Birmingham)
  • 2010/04 - 2012/03 Japan Society for the Promotion of Science Research Fellow (DC2, University of Tokyo)

Education

  • 2011 - 2012  Massachusetts Institute of Technology  Department of Linguistics and Philosophy (Visiting Student)
  • 2008 - 2012  University of Tokyo  Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology (PhD)
  • 2008 - 2010  Yale University  Department of Philosophy (Visiting Assistant in Research)
  • 2006 - 2008  University of Tokyo  Graduate School of Humanities and Sociology (MA)

Research Activities

Published Papers

  • Uku Tooming, Kengo Miyazono
    SYNTHESE 0039-7857 2020/10 
    Imaginings are often characterized in terms of vividness. However, there is little agreement in the philosophical literature as to what it amounts to and how to even investigate it. In this paper, we propose a natural kind methodology to study vividness and suggest treating it as a homeostatic property cluster with an underlying nature that explains the correlation of properties in that cluster. This approach relies on the empirical research on the vividness of mental imagery and contrasts with those accounts that treat vividness as an explanatory primitive and with those that attempt to provide a definition. We apply the natural kind methodology to make several substantive (but also provisional) claims about the vividness of mental imagery. First, we will argue that it forms a homeostatic property cluster, in that it is reliably correlated with, but not defined by, some properties, such as the level of detail, clarity, perception-likeness and intensity. In arguing for this claim, we also show how the cluster can be modified in the light of empirical research by complementing it with a correlation between vividness and familiarity. Second, we will argue that these correlations can be explained by an underlying property at the architectural level; i.e., the availability of stored sensory information for the elaboration of a mental image.
  • Kengo Miyazono, Alessandro Salice
    SYNTHESE 0039-7857 2020/09 [Refereed][Not invited]
     
    The dominant conception of delusion in psychiatry (in textbooks, research papers, diagnostic manuals, etc.) is predominantly epistemic. Delusions are almost always characterized in terms of their epistemic defects, i.e., defects with respect to evidence, reasoning, judgment, etc. However, there is an individualistic bias in the epistemic conception; the alleged epistemic defects and abnormalities in delusions relate to individualistic epistemic processes rather than social epistemic processes. We endorse the social epistemological turn in recent philosophical epistemology, and claim that a corresponding turn is needed in the study of delusions. It is a turn from the (purely) individualistic conception, which characterizes delusions only by individualistic epistemic defects and abnormalities, to the (partially) social epistemic conception, which characterizes delusions by individualistic as well as social epistemic defects and abnormalities. This paper is intended as an initial step toward such a social epistemological turn. In particular, we will develop a new model of the development of delusions according to which testimonial abnormalities, including testimonial isolation and testimonial discount, are a causal factor in the development of delusions.
  • 宮園 健吾
    哲学雑誌 哲学会 ; 1892- 134 (807) 90 - 113 0387-3366 2020
  • Alessandro Salice, Kengo Miyazono
    PHILOSOPHICAL PSYCHOLOGY 33 (1) 42 - 63 0951-5089 2020/01 [Refereed][Not invited]
     
    Within social psychology, group identification refers to a mental process that leads an individual to conceive of herself as a group member. This phenomenon has recently attracted a great deal of attention in the debate about shared agency. In this debate, group identification is appealing to many because it appears to explain important forms of intentionally shared actions in a cognitively unsophisticated way. This paper argues that, unless important issues about group identification are not illuminated, the heuristic function ascribed to this notion for an understanding of shared agency remains dubious at best and unfulfilled at worst. This paper offers such a clarification by distinguishing and describing two different mental processes that constitute group identification: adoption of the group perspective and transformation in self-understanding. It is claimed that the latter process consists in the production of what Ruth Millikan labels "Pushmi-Pullyu representations" and that it is developmentally prior with respect to the ability of adopting the group perspective.
  • Kengo Miyazono, Ryan McKay
    COGNITIVE NEUROPSYCHIATRY 24 (5) 335 - 346 1354-6805 2019/09 [Refereed][Not invited]
     
    Introduction: In this paper we present and defend a hybrid theory of the development of delusions that incorporates the central ideas of two influential (yet sometimes bitterly opposing) theoretical approaches to delusions-the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory. Method: After introducing the central ideas of the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory, we describe the motivations for our conciliatory project, explain the theoretical details of the hybrid theory we propose, and answer potential objections to our proposal. Results: According to the hybrid theory we advance, the first factor of a delusion is physically grounded in an abnormal prediction error, and the second factor is physically grounded in the overestimation of the precision of the abnormal prediction error. Against anticipated objections, we argue that the hybrid theory is internally coherent, and that it constitutes a genuine hybrid between the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory. Conclusion: A rapprochement between the two-factor theory and the prediction error theory is both possible and desirable. In particular, our hybrid theory provides a parsimonious and unified account of delusions, whether monothematic or polythematic, across a wide variety of medical conditions.
  • Kengo Miyazono
    BRITISH JOURNAL OF AESTHETICS 59 (3) 342 - 344 0007-0904 2019/07 [Refereed][Not invited]
  • Miyazono, Kengo
    RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA MIMESIS EDIZIONI 9 (1) 73 - 80 2039-4667 2018/05 [Refereed][Not invited]
     
    Sinhababu's Humean Nature contains many interesting and important ideas, but in this short commentary I focus on the idea of vivid representations. Sinhababu inherits his idea of vivid representations from Hume's discussions, in particular his discussion of calm and violent passions. I am sympathetic to the idea of developing Hume's insight that has been largely neglected by philosophers. I believe that Sinhababu and Hume are on the right track. What I do in this short commentary is to raise some questions about the details. The aim of asking these questions is not to challenge Sinhababu's proposal (at least his main ideas), but rather to point at some interesting issues arising out of his proposal. The questions are about (1) the nature of vividness, (2) the effects of vivid representations, and (3) Sinhababu's account of alief cases.
  • Kengo Miyazono
    SYNTHESE 194 (9) 3523 - 3541 0039-7857 2017/09 [Refereed][Not invited]
     
    In discussing the famous case of Otto, a patient with Alzheimer's disease who carries around a notebook to keep important information, Clark and Chalmers argue that some of Otto's beliefs are physically realized in the notebook. In other words, some of Otto's beliefs are extended into the environment. Their main argument is a functionalist one. Some of Otto's beliefs are physically realized in the notebook because, first, some of the beliefs of Inga, a healthy person who remembers important information in her head, are physically realized in her internal memory storage, and, second, there is no relevant functional difference between the role of the notebook for Otto and the role of the internal memory storage for Inga. The paper presents a new objection to this argument. I call it "the systems reply" to the functionalist argument since it is structurally analogous to the "the systems reply" to Searle's Chinese room argument. According to the systems reply to the functionalist argument, what actually follows from their argument is not that beliefs of Otto are physically realized in the notebook but rather that the beliefs of the hybrid system consisting of Otto and his notebook are physically realized in the notebook. This paper also discusses Sprevak's claim that the functionalist argument entails radical versions of extended mental states and shows that his argument is also vulnerable to the systems reply.
  • Kengo Miyazono
    INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF PSYCHOLOGY 51 87 - 88 0020-7594 2016/07 [Refereed][Not invited]
  • Book Review: Knowledge through Imagination. Amy Kind and Peter Kung (Editors). Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016.
    Masashi Kasaki, Kengo Miyazono
    Journal of Mind and Behavior 37 (2) 175 - 181 2016/04 [Not refereed][Invited]
  • Lisa Bortolotti, Kengo Miyazono
    ERKENNTNIS 81 (2) 275 - 296 0165-0106 2016/04 [Refereed][Not invited]
     
    In this paper we address the ethics of adopting delusional beliefs and we apply consequentialist and deontological considerations to the epistemic evaluation of delusions. Delusions are characterised by their epistemic shortcomings and they are often defined as false and irrational beliefs. Despite this, when agents are overwhelmed by negative emotions due to the effects of trauma or previous adversities, or when they are subject to anxiety and stress as a result of hypersalient experience, the adoption of a delusional belief can prevent a serious epistemic harm from occurring. For instance, delusions can allow agents to remain in touch with their environment overcoming the disruptive effect of negative emotions and anxiety. Moreover, agents are not blameworthy for adopting their delusions if their ability to believe otherwise is compromised. There is evidence suggesting that no evidence-related action that would counterfactually lead them to believe otherwise is typically available to them. The lack of ability to believe otherwise, together with some other conditions, implies that the agents are not blameworthy for their delusions. The examination of the epistemic status of delusions prompts us to (1) acknowledge the complexity and contextual nature of epistemic evaluation, (2) establish connections between consequentialist and deontological frameworks in epistemology, and (3) introduce the notion of epistemic innocence into the vocabulary of epistemic evaluation.
  • Lisa Bortolotti, Kengo Miyazono
    PHILOSOPHY COMPASS 10 (9) 636 - 645 1747-9991 2015/09 [Refereed][Invited]
     
    In this paper we review two debates in the current literature on clinical delusions. One debate is about what delusions are. If delusions are beliefs, why are they described as failing to play the causal roles that characterise beliefs, such as being responsive to evidence and guiding action? The other debate is about how delusions develop. What processes lead people to form delusions and maintain them in the face of challenges and counter-evidence? Do the formation and maintenance of delusions require abnormal experience alone, or also reasoning biases or deficits? We hope to show that the focus on delusions has made a substantial contribution to the philosophy of the mind and continues to raise issues that are central to defining the concept of belief and gaining a better understanding of how people process information and learn about the world.
  • Kengo Miyazono
    CONSCIOUSNESS AND COGNITION 33 561 - 573 1053-8100 2015/05 [Refereed][Invited]
     
    Delusional beliefs are typically pathological. Being pathological is clearly distinguished from being false or being irrational. Anna might falsely believe that his husband is having an affair but it might just be a simple mistake. Again, Sam might irrationally believe, without good evidence, that he is smarter than his colleagues, but it might just be a healthy self-deceptive belief. On the other hand, when a patient with brain damage caused by a car accident believes that his father was replaced by an imposter or another patient with schizophrenia believes that "The Organization" painted the shops on a street in red and green to convey a message, these beliefs are not merely false or irrational. They are pathological. What makes delusions pathological? This paper explores the negative features because of which delusional beliefs are pathological. First, I critically examine the proposals according to which delusional beliefs are pathological because of (1) their strangeness, (2) their extreme irrationality, (3) their resistance to folk psychological explanations or (4) impaired responsibility-grounding capacities of people with them. I present some counterexamples as well as theoretical problems for these proposals. Then, I argue, following Wakefield's harmful dysfunction analysis of disorder, that delusional beliefs are pathological because they involve some sorts of harmful malfunctions. In other words, they have a significant negative impact on wellbeing (=harmful) and, in addition, some psychological mechanisms, directly or indirectly related to them, fail to perform the jobs for which they were selected in the past (=malfunctioning). An objection to the proposal is that delusional beliefs might not involve any malfunctions. For example, they might be playing psychological defence functions properly. Another objection is that a harmful malfunction is not sufficient for something to be pathological. For example, false beliefs might involve some malfunctions according to teleosemantics, a popular naturalist account of mental content, but harmful false beliefs do not have to be pathological. I examine those objections in detail and show that they should be rejected after all. (C) 2014 Published by Elsevier Inc.
  • Lisa Bortolotti, Kengo Miyazono
    TEOREMA 34 (1) 135 - 148 0210-1602 2015 [Refereed][Invited]
     
    In this brief commentary, we examine the account of thought insertion provided by Jordi Fernandez in his book, Transparent Minds. We highlight some of the strengths of the account, and raise one main objection to it. In mainstream philosophical accounts of thought insertion, people who report the delusion are thought to have ownership of the alien thoughts, but to lack a sense of agency with respect to such thoughts. Fernandez correctly identifies the limitations of mainstream accounts of thought insertion and articulates a promising alternative. As he does so, though, he relies on the claim that alien thoughts are beliefs, and we challenge that claim. People with thought insertion do not commit to the truth of the content of the alien thought.
  • Kengo Miyazono, Lisa Bortolotti
    AVANT 5 (3) 30 - 50 2082-7598 2014/12 [Refereed][Invited]
  • Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophical Reviews (Tetsugaku Kenkyu Ronshu) 7 115 - 137 2013/12 [Not refereed][Not invited]
  • Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophy of Science (Kagaku Tetsugaku) 44 (2) 83 - 98 2011/11 [Refereed][Not invited]
  • Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophy (Tetsugaku) 62 345 - 359 2011/04 [Refereed][Not invited]
  • Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophical Studies (Ronshu) 29 147 - 160 2010/03 [Refereed][Not invited]
  • Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophical Review (Tetsugaku Kenkyu Ronshu) 6 92 - 106 2010/03 [Not refereed][Not invited]
  • Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophical Studies (Ronshu) 28 146 - 159 2009/03 [Refereed][Not invited]
  • Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophical Studies (Tetsugaku Kenkyu Ronshu) 5 138 - 154 2008/10 [Not refereed][Not invited]
  • Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophical Studies (Ronshu) 27 170 - 184 2008/03 [Refereed][Not invited]
  • Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophical Reviews (Tetsugaku Kenkyu Ronshu) 4 170 - 184 2007/09 [Not refereed][Not invited]

Books etc

  • 宮園, 健吾, 大谷, 弘, 乘立, 雄輝 
    武蔵野大学出版会 2020/01 (ISBN: 9784903281452) 394p
  • M. H. Bor (Joint work"Belief")
    SAGE 2018/05 
    Lifespan human development is the study of all aspects of biological, physical, cognitive, socioemotional, and contextual development from conception to the end of life. In approximately 800 signed articles by experts from a wide diversity of fields, The SAGE Encyclopedia of Lifespan Human Development explores all individual and situational factors related to human development across the lifespan.
  • D. Pritchard (Joint work"Belief and imagination")
    Oxford University Press 2016/09
  • 石原, 孝二, 信原, 幸弘, 糸川, 昌成, 宮園, 健吾, Fuchs, Thomas, 田中, 彰吾, 立木, 康介, 黒木, 俊秀, 石垣, 琢麿, 村井, 俊哉 
    東京大学出版会 2016/08 (ISBN: 9784130141819) vii, 219, 8p
  • 石原幸二, 信原幸宏, 糸川昌成編 (Joint work第3章「妄想の形成と維持:二要因理論と予測エラー理論」)
    東京大学出版会 2016/08
  • A. Kind (Joint workChapter 17: "The cognitive architecture of imaginative resistance")
    Routledge 2016/01
  • N. Galbraith (Joint workChapter 1: "Prediction-error and two-factor theories of delusion formation: competitors or allies?")
    Psychology Press 2014/11
  • 信原, 幸弘, 太田, 紘史, 服部, 裕幸, 西堤, 優, 柏端, 達也, 宮園, 健吾 
    勁草書房 2014/05 (ISBN: 9784326199235) iv, 242, vip
  • 信原幸弘, 太田紘史 (Joint work第5章「妄想とその原因」)
    勁草書房 2014/05

Conference Activities & Talks

  • Epistemic libertarian paternalism
    Kengo Miyazono
    Workshop: Striving for Perfection  2021/02
  • Epistemic theodicy and doxastic voluntarism
    Kengo Miyazono
    Analytic Philosophy of Religion in Asia  2020/11
  • What is in a drink title?  [Not invited]
    Uku Tooming, Kengo Miyazono
    1st International Workshop on the Philosophy of Sake  2020/02
  • Visual experience without presentational phenomenology  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    2019/09  National Yang Ming University
  • Epistemic libertarian paternalism  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    2019/09  National Chung Cheng University
  • Epistemic libertarian paternalism  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    2019/09  National Taiwan University
  • Epistemic libertarian paternalism  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Analytic Philosophy Workshop  2019/08  Yonsei University
  • Delusion and self-knowledge  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    International Conference on Phenomenology and Philosophy of Mind  2019/05  Huaqiao University
  • Intermediate agency  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Tokyo Workshop on Agency and Cognition  2019/02  University of Tokyo
  • Can artificial consciousness be radically different from human consciousness?  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Artificial Intelligence Beyond Now: Can AI Be Conscious?  2019/01  Nagoya University of Foreign Studies
  • On the very idea of an axiom of consciousness  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    CORN 2019  2019/01  Okazaki Conference Center, Okazaki
  • Husserlian modal epistemology of consciousness  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Rationality, Representation, and Reality  2018/12  University of Tokyo
  • Social factors in delusion formation: Causation or construction?  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono, Alessandro Salice
    International Workshop on Philosophy of Psychiatry  2018/12  University of Tokyo
  • Perception without presentational phenomenology  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    3rd International Conference on Natural Cognition: Experience, Concepts, and Agency  2018/11  University of Macau [Skype talk]
  • Intermediate agency  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Setouchi Philosophy Forum: Action, Skill, and Know-How  2018/11  Okayama University
  • Social factors in delusion formation  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono, Alessandro Salice
    The 3rd Cork Annual Workshop on Social Agency  2018/08  University College Cork
  • The role of imagination in philosophical thought experiments  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Hamburg-Japan Philosophy Workshop  2018/08  University of Hamburg
  • Aliefs and pushmi-pullyu representations  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Workshop: Agency & Decision  2018/08  Lund University
  • Does empathy make the world a better place?  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Helsinki Workshop on Empathy and Emotional Sharing  2018/08  University of Helsinki
  • 共感で世界は良くなるか?  [Not invited]
    宮園健吾
    公開ワークショップ:共感  2018/07  広島大学
  • 動物は守られるべきか?  [Invited]
    宮園健吾
    公開ワークショップ:なぜ生き物を守らなければならないのか  2018/07  広島大学
  • Imagination and Husserlian eidetic variation  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Setouchi Philosophy Forum: Bridging Analytic and Phenomenological Approaches  2018/07  Hiroshima Institute of Technology
  • Time and well-being  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    5th Annual Conference of The International Association for the Philosophy of Time  2018/06  Lotte City Hotel Myeongdong, Seoul
  • Hume on the phenomenology of belief  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Setouchi Philosophy Forum: Hume & Berkeley  2018/02  Hiroshima University
  • ヒュームと共感のバイアス  [Invited]
    宮園健吾
    瀬戸内哲学研究会ワークショップ:共感と倫理  2018/02  広島工業大学
  • 二人称的観点の認識論?  [Not invited]
    宮園健吾
    因果・動物・所有:一ノ瀬哲学をめぐる対話  2017/12  東京大学
  • 現象学と分析哲学における内観的方法  [Invited]
    宮園健吾
    瀬戸内哲学研究会  2017/11  岡山大学
  • 知覚の現前的現象性(presentational phenomenology)について  [Invited]
    宮園健吾
    哲学会第五十六回研究発表大会  2017/10  東京大学
  • Implicit biases and pushmi-pullyu representations  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    The 17th Biennial Conference of the International Society for Theoretical Psychology  2017/08  Rikkyo University
  • Experimental psychology and architecture of imagination  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Workshop: Art & Mind  2017/08  University of Tokyo
  • 人間と動物:哲学の観点から  [Invited]
    宮園健吾
    公開ワークショップ:動物と自然をめぐる暴力と共生  2017/07  広島大学
  • Being one of us: Group identification, joint actions and collective intentionality  [Not invited]
    Alessandro Salice, Kengo Miyazono
    Tokyo Workshop on Social and Collective Self-Conscious Emotions  2017/07  University of Tokyo
  • Aliefs and pushmi-pullyu representations  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    PERFECT Seminar  2017/03  University of Birmingham
  • A hybrid theory of delusion formation  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    PERFECT Reading Group  2017/03  University of Birmingham
  • A hybrid theory of delusion formation  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophy,Psychology,and Informatics Group  2017/03  University of Edinburgh
  • Philosophy and Psychology of Well-Being  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophy, Psychology, and Scientific Thought Programme by A. Meskin  2017/03  University of Leeds
  • Implicit biases and pushmi-pullyu representations  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Minority and Philosophy Group at Leeds  2017/03  University of Leeds
  • Intergroup bias, emotion, and pushmi-pullyu representation  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Social Self-Conscious Emotions: The 2nd Cork Annual Workshop on Social Agency  2017/03  University College Cork
  • Does functionalism entail extended mind?  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophy of Mind (MA) by J. Walmsley & A. Salice  2017/03  University College Cork
  • Perception without presentational phenomenology  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophy Research Seminar  2017/03  University College Cork
  • 妄想の形成と維持  [Invited]
    宮園健吾
    シンポジウム『精神医学の哲学』  2017/03  東京大学
  • The evolutionary debunking argument defeats itself  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Current Trends in Analytical Philosophy  2016/08  Yonsei University
  • Implicit biases and pushmi-pullyu representations  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    The 3rd Conference on Contemporary Philosophy in East Asia  2016/08  Seoul National University
  • なぜ心理学に哲学が必要なのか  [Invited]
    宮園健吾
    第30回人間文化研究会夏の大会  2016/08  広島大学
  • Perception without presentational phenomenology  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Philosophy of Mind & Mental Illness Symposium  2016/07  University of Tokyo
  • A hybrid theory of delusion formation  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    The 31st International Congress of Psychology  2016/07  PACIFICO Yokohama
  • The evolutionary debunking argument defeats itself  [Invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    UHamburg-UTokyo Workshop: Language & Reality  2016/06  University of Tokyo
  • コメント:ワークショップ「イギリス思想における常識と啓蒙の系譜:18世紀スコットランドから20世紀ケンブリッジへ」  [Invited]
    宮園健吾
    日本イギリス哲学会第40回総会・研究大会  2016/03  学習院大学
  • Aliefs and pushmi-pullyu representations  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    The 2nd International Conference on Natural Cognition: Rationality and Its Rivals  2015/12  University of Macau
  • The role of imagination in philosophical thought experiments  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    The Centre for Metaphysics and Mind Seminar  2015/07  University of Leeds
  • The role of imagination in philosophical thought experiments  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Birmingham Work-In-Progress Seminar  2015/06  University of Birmingham
  • Prediction-errors and two-factors: A hybrid approach  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Delusions Lunchtime Seminar  2015/06  University of Birmingham
  • The role of imagination in philosophical thought experiments  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Tokyo Forum for Analytic Philosophy  2015/05  University of Tokyo
  • Does functionalism entail extended mind?  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    Korean Society for Analytic Philosophy 2015 Spring Meeting  2015/05  Hankuk University of Foreign Studies
  • 目的意味論と進化心理学  [Not invited]
    宮園健吾
    第74回日本哲学会大会  2015/05  上智大学
  • ヒュームと信念の主観的な質  [Invited]
    宮園健吾
    カント・アーベント  2015/04  東京大学
  • Does functionalism entail extended mind?  [Not invited]
    Kengo Miyazono
    The 53rd Tokyo Colloquium of Cognitive Philosophy  2015/02  University of Tokyo
  • 妄想の形成・維持についての2つの理論  [Invited]
    宮園健吾
    PPP研究会  2015/01  東京大学

Research Grants & Projects

  • Phenomenology of Altered Consciousness: An Interdisciplinary Approach through Philosophy, Mathematics, Neuroscience, and Robotics
    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science:Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (A)
    Date (from‐to) : 2020/04 -2023/03 
    Author : 田口 茂, 吉田 正俊, 西郷 甲矢人, 宮園 健吾, 谷 淳, 田中 彰吾, 山下 祐一, 西尾 慶之, 武内 大, 富山 豊
  • Using Imagination to Learn What to Want
    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science:Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellows
    Date (from‐to) : 2019/11 -2022/03 
    Author : 宮園 健吾, TOOMING UKU
  • Expanding the Notion of Agency: Building An International Research Network on Cognition, Behavior, and Action
    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science:JSPS Grant-in-Aid Scientific Research (B)
    Date (from‐to) : 2019/04 -2020/03 
    Author : Kengo Miyazono, Richard Dietz, rsity of Tokyo, John O'Dea, rsity of Tokyo, Akiko Frischhut, Akita International University
  • Expanding the Notion of Agency: Building An International Research Network on Cognition, Behavior and Action
    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science:JSPS Grant-in-Aid for Scientific Research (B)
    Date (from‐to) : 2018/04 -2019/03 
    Author : Kengo Miyazono, Richard Dietz, Yamanashi Gakuin, Akiko Frischhut, Akita Internatioanl, John O'Dea (Tok
  • 感情の哲学の学際化に向けた国際的研究体制の構築:現象学的な方法の検討を通して
    サントリー文化財団:サントリー文化財団:人文科学、社会科学に関する学際的グループ研究助成
    Date (from‐to) : 2017/08 -2018/07 
    Author : 植村玄輝, 宮園健吾, Alessandro Salice、Alba Montes Sánchez、Simon Høffding, 石原孝二, 榊原英輔, 前田泰樹, 松本直子
  • Japan Society for the Promotion of Science:Grants-in-Aid for Scientific Research Grant-in-Aid for Research Activity start-up
    Date (from‐to) : 2016/08 -2018/03 
    Author : Miyazono Kengo
     
    The aim of this project is to explain the causes and the effects of irrational and/or abnormal beliefs. The subproject 1 aims to explain the cause of abnormal beliefs (i.e., delusions). I proposed a hybrid theory of delusion formation, which combines the basic ideas of two influential theories; i.e., two-factor theory and prediction-error theory. The subproject 2 aims to explain the behavioural consequences of irrational beliefs or, more precisely, the the irrational incoherence between beliefs and behavioural outputs. I argue that many cases of belief-behaviour incoherence are explained in terms of what Ruth Millikan calls 'pushmi-pullyu representations' (PPRs).The outcomes of this project are incorporated in two forthcoming books from Routledge and Polity.
  • デイヴィッド・ヒュームの哲学における自然主義と道徳感情論(Dr. Peter Kail, University of Oxford)
    日本学術振興会:日本学術振興会:外国人招へい研究者(短期)
    Date (from‐to) : 2018/02 -2018/03 
    Author : 宮園健吾
  • 美学に関する日本と英米の比較研究:「美」を通じた国際的な相互理解へ向けて(Dr. Aaron Meskin, University of Leeds)
    平和中島財団:平和中島財団:国際学術研究助成(外国人研究者等招致助成)
    Date (from‐to) : 2017/07 -2017/08 
    Author : 宮園健吾
  • 感情の哲学の学際化に向けた国際的研究体制の構築:社会的・集団的な自己意識的感情を事例として
    サントリー文化財団:サントリー文化財団:人文科学、社会科学に関する学際的グループ研究助成
    Date (from‐to) : 2016/08 -2017/07 
    Author : 宮園健吾, 石原孝二, 唐沢かおり, Alba Montes, Sánchez (Copenhagen, 森岡正芳, Vasu Reddy (Po, smouth, Alessandro Salice, UC, Cor, Mikko Salmela (Helsinki, Christian von Scheve, FU, Be, 陶久明日香, 榊原英輔, 植村玄輝
  • Cause of Delusion and Belief Formation Processe
    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science:JSPS Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Research Fellow
    Date (from‐to) : 2015/04 -2016/03 
    Author : Kengo Miyazono
  • Epistemology of Modality and Philosophical Inquiry
    Japan Society for the Promotion of Science:JSPS Grant-in-Aid for JSPS Fellow
    Date (from‐to) : 2010 -2011 
    Author : 宮園 健吾
     
    ■今年度は、想像力というテーマを中心にしつつ、それに関連するいくつかの心的現象をテーマとして研究を進めてきた。 ■昨年度に引き続き、想像的抵抗という現象を通じて想像力の本性を探るという趣旨の研究を進めてきた。米国マサチューセッツ工科大学に滞在し、A.Byrne等の幾人かの研究者と意見交換をしつつ、想像的抵抗についての2つの論文"Imaginative Resistance and Higher-Lower Inconsistency""Imaginative Resistance and Moral-Conventional Tasks"を準備中である。 ■統合失調症などにおいて見られる妄想を、通常考えられているように一種の信念としてではなく、むしろ一種の想像と見なすというG.Currie(Nottingham)らの提案を詳しく検討してきた。Currieらの想像説を支持する2つの議論、機能的役割からの議論(妄想の機能的役割は、信念の機能的役割にではなくむしろ想像の機能的役割に合致している)及びメタ認知的失敗からの議論(妄想患者がメタ認知的な脆弱性を持っているといういくらかの経験的な研究結果は想像説から導かれる予測に合致している)に関して、当初これらの議論は十分に擁護可能だと私は考え、その趣旨の口頭発表なども行ったが、その後、マサチューセッツ工科大学に滞在しつつ詳しく検討を行う中で、これらの議論の重要な問題点に気付き、当初の見込みを大幅に変更することとなった。現時点までの研究成果をいくつかの場にて口頭発表、ポスター発表の形で公表した。現在、このトピックに関する2つの論文"Delusions as Malfunctioning Beliefs""What is the Role of Imagination in Delusion?"をまとめる作業を行っている。


Copyright © MEDIA FUSION Co.,Ltd. All rights reserved.